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ABSTRACT
Fringe terrorism is common during nonviolent campaigns. We exam-
ine how this can modify the strategic environment between dissident
groups and the state in ways that present both challenges and
opportunities to moderate factions. Terrorism is intended to promote
violent escalation in a conﬂict, but we argue that fringe terrorist
activities in a nonviolent campaign under certain conditions can
induce an advantage for well-organized moderate factions. The risk
of escalation following terrorism can give the government more
incentives to oﬀer concessions to moderate campaign leaders if the
movement can credibly prevent armed escalation. The ability to
control and prevent violence is more likely when nonviolent move-
ments have a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership, as
such campaigns are better able to prevent shifts by supporters
towards violent fringes. Using new data on terrorist attacks by fac-
tions sharing the same overall objectives as ongoing nonviolent
campaigns, we show that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to
see substantial gains in spite of fringe terrorist activities when
a movement has a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership.
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Terrorism; civil resistance
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Introduction
Recent research has argued that nonviolent dissent tends to be more eﬀective than armed
violence and highlighted its many strategic advantages.1 There is a conceptually clear
distinction between resistance campaigns that primarily rely on organized violence or
nonviolence, and shifts from the former to the latter as dominant tactics are relatively rare.
However, many primarily nonviolent campaigns still see much smaller-scale fringe poli-
tical violence such as riots or terrorist attacks. We posit that fringe terrorism can modify
the strategic environment between nonviolent organizations and the states through
a credible threat of escalation.2 We argue that even though states are generally reluctant
to concede to dissidents, they also have incentives to make concessions to more moderate
nonviolent factions, if this can help undermine violent factions that pose a credible threat.3
Accommodation to moderate factions may be a lesser evil to states when moderate
nonviolent organizations can credibly limit radicalization and a drift towards support
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for violence in their support base.4 Using new data on terrorism in nonviolent resistance
campaigns between 1946 and 2006, we ﬁnd a higher likelihood of substantial political
gains when fringe terrorism occurs during nonviolent campaigns with a hierarchical
structure and a centralized leadership, consistent with our argument that states have
more incentives to accommodate moderate campaigns when this can help sideline violent
fringe groups.
Radical ﬂanks: harmful or helpful?
There is a large body of research studying the overall eﬀects of “radical ﬂanks” on the
outcomes of political dissent, and in particular whether fringe violence makes it more or
less likely that nonviolent campaigns see progress towards their goals.5 Yet, a clear answer
has remained elusive; some studies argue that violent ﬂanks undermine nonviolent
resistance campaigns,6 while others hold that violence by radical ﬂanks can strengthen
moderate groups relative to the state.7
The disparate ﬁndings across the existing literature may reﬂect that there simply is no
general or systematic relationship between violent ﬂanks and campaign outcomes.
However, in our view, existing research also suﬀers from key theoretical and methodolo-
gical limitations. The mechanisms through which fringe violence could aﬀect political
outcomes of civil resistance campaigns often remain unclear. It is also unclear what types
of violence could aﬀect the strategic environment surrounding a nonviolent campaign.
Finally, with some exceptions,8 most research has tended to focus on individual case
studies, often selected to illustrate a speciﬁc argument, rather than systematic evaluation
or identiﬁcation of the most common patterns and outcomes.
With regard to mechanisms, some literature emphasizes how violent ﬂanks can gen-
erate crises that “are resolved to moderate advantage,” by favoring greater acceptance of
the goals and methods of moderate organizations.9 Herbert Haines, for example, suggests
that radical violent activities strengthened the power of moderate organizations in the US
civil-rights movement through increased donations.10 Similarly, Jo Freeman shows that
violent activities within the US women’s liberation movement increased the bargaining
power of the reformist organizations.11 Carol McClurg Muller ﬁnds that assaults on
civilians and property during the US civil-rights movement increased the authorities’
willingness to provide short-term symbolic reassurance.12 Other scholars, however,
emphasize how violent activities can discredit a nonviolent movement and drive away
potential supporters. Erica Chenoweth and Kurt Schock ﬁnd that fringe violence is
generally associated with lower active participation in nonviolent campaigns.13 Their
study of four civil resistance campaigns suggests that radical ﬂank violence at best has
highly varied and unpredictable eﬀects on political outcomes.
Existing work tends to deﬁne radical ﬂanks in nonviolent campaigns rather generally in
terms of either extreme positions and ideology,14 or advocacy for more militant tactics.15
Most studies thus fail to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of violence, even though
distinct forms of violence can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on the strategic environment
between a government and a nonviolent dissident campaign. We argue that diﬀerent
violent activities have distinct implications for the government’s threat perception,
depending on the degree of organization involved as well as the potential for conﬂict
escalation. We focus on fringe terrorist activities in civil resistance campaigns, carried out
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by groups that try to appeal to the same aggrieved population as the dominant nonviolent
organizations. Fringe violence can come in many forms, ranging from spontaneous riots,
which are often emotionally driven responses to police violence, to more organized forms
of violence—such as guerrilla warfare—that require military training and planning. We
focus on terrorism as a form of smaller-scale organized violence particularly likely to
occur in dissident campaigns. Unlike largely disorganized forms of violence such as riots
and police clashes, terrorism entails deliberately planned and organized attacks against
intermediate targets to coerce the government and its supporters. Terrorism is less labour
and equipment intensive than conventional armed violence, and can be carried out with
limited active participation and material resources. Terrorism is often seen as a means to
larger ends, where small groups use attacks to raise their proﬁle and attract supporters, in
the hope of eventually mounting organized violence against the state. There is of course an
extensive literature on whether terrorism in general is “eﬀective,” without a clear scholarly
consensus.16 However, a very broad set of groups perpetrates terrorism at some point, and
“success” depends on either the objectives of speciﬁc actors or the criteria applied by
observers. We have a more speciﬁc focus on the potential eﬀects of fringe terrorism on the
political outcomes in ongoing dissident campaigns. We also consider a speciﬁc measure of
success in terms of the objectives of the larger moderate campaign, which often may not
fully correspond to the more ambitious goals of the individual terrorist cells.
Terrorism as a “game changer”
We posit that terrorism can modify the strategic environment between dissident cam-
paigns and the government by generating a credible threat of conﬂict escalation.17 Radical
fringes may resort to terrorism due to ideological and strategic disagreements with
competing factions within a nonviolent campaign, and divergent beliefs on the eﬃcacy
of violent attacks.18 Radical fringe factions typically lack suﬃcient resources to engage in
direct conventional military violence against the government, but can carry out indirect
terrorist attacks that can impose signiﬁcant costs on the government through their
broader economic and political consequences. Terrorist attacks reﬂect organized activities
and deliberate planning, unlike disorganized forms of violence such as riots and clashes
with the police. Threats to launch an organized insurgency are unlikely to be credible at
the outset,19 but a salient terrorist campaign could make future escalation more realistic,
by allowing groups to grow support and resources.20 Terrorism can help demonstrate
resolve or commitment to the cause, and raise the proﬁle of a faction and attract more
supporters, with the hope that the group may eventually be in a position to mount more
sustained organized violence against the state.
Terrorist campaigns often fail to realize their dreams of instigating successful popular
revolts, but there are several examples where fringe groups have grown from small-scale
terrorist activities to large-scale violence. Existing research shows that terrorist attacks are
a leading indicator of subsequent outbreaks of civil war. Michael Findley and Joseph
Young highlight how groups resort to terrorist attacks “at the beginning of a violent
conﬂict or before civil war to provoke the state, build support and capacity, and thus
challenge the state.”21 For example, the Red Brigades, a violent ﬂank of the New Leftist
movement in Italy, clearly expressed the logic of terrorist attacks as a strategy to attract
greater support in their 1978 strategic manifesto:
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In this phase, the struggle must assume, by the initiative of the revolutionary vanguards, the
form of war… . we … want war! … revolutionary violence pushes the enemy to face it, … it
forces the enemy to react, to operate on the terrain of war: we intend to mobilize and to ﬂush
out the imperialist counterrevolution from the folds of the ‘democratic’ society where it has
comfortably hidden in better times!22
Terrorism can also be used as a provocation or outbidding tactic. The former aims to provoke
the state to respond with repression, based on the expectation that repression will encourage
greater popular mobilization against the state.23 As an example, Andy Truskier highlights
how eﬀorts to prepare for armed struggle in the campaign against the Brazilian government
in the 1970s actively sought to provoke the government: “[b]y ﬁring on workers, the army
makes the people angry and brings them to the point of understanding action on yet another
level—that is, action directed against the military.”24 Outbidding strategies aim to win over
support, and to raise the proﬁle of a group relative to competing dissident factions.25 Fringe
groups often highlighted terrorist attacks as helpful for increasing support and recruitment.
As an example, Massoud Ahmad-Zadeh, a leader in the Iranian People’s Fadaee during the
uprising against the Shah, notes how “[g]roups [that] take up arms and extend the struggle,
thereby [increase] the possibilities of material support from the people.”26
The government and the moderate leadership of nonviolent campaigns clearly have
opposing interests on the main issues in a conﬂict, but they can also have some degree of
shared interest in avoiding escalating violence. On one hand, even if governments seek to
minimize overall dissent, violent extremism may be deemed a worse prospect than
nonviolent dissent. On the other hand, moderate nonviolent organizations have an
interest in avoiding violence that can undermine the nonviolent campaign, and preventing
a loss of support to violent fringe groups.
The ﬁrst response of a government is normally to repress dissent,27 but indiscriminate
repression often backﬁres, potentially increasing popular support and alienating the
security forces.28 When terrorism is used as “provocation” and to radicalize supporters,
indiscriminate repression can reduce the opportunity costs for supporting violence relative
to nonviolence.29 More selective counterterrorism and repression against violent factions
is often diﬃcult and will require substantial time and eﬀorts. As such, it is not surprising
that successful counterterrorism often combines coercive policing with accommodation
strategies, aiming to win hearts and minds through concessions. Concessions to moderate
factions in nonviolent mass dissident campaigns may help isolate extremist groups and
avoid escalation. Governments are unlikely to accommodate factions using terrorism,
which may set a dangerous precedent.30 By contrast, oﬀering concessions to nonviolent
movements is less unattractive, since “there is more space for negotiations, compromise,
power sharing and even complete accommodation when regime members do not fear that
losses of power will directly translate into rolling heads.”31 Thus, governments facing both
large-scale nonviolent campaigns and fringe terrorism have greater incentives to oﬀer
concessions to moderates if this can help to avoid escalating violent conﬂict and to secure
a more controlled transition.
Hierarchical structure and centralized leadership
Simply oﬀering concessions to moderate organizations does not guarantee decreased support
for violent fringe groups, and governments may fear that it could encourage more violence.
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Nonetheless, concessions to nonviolent campaigns become more appealing when
a government can expect moderate campaigns to have suﬃcient capacity to prevent increas-
ing support for violent ﬂanks and escalation after concessions.32 A nonviolent campaign with
a hierarchical structure and centralized leadership is better able to implement coherent
strategies and control its support base.33 Thus, civil resistance campaigns with such char-
acteristics have a credible capacity to limit violence for governments. Hierarchical structures
help strengthen the leadership’s capacity to regulate dissent and contentious politics,34 and
coordination can decrease the costs of participation in dissent, which increases
eﬀectiveness.35 Formal lines of communication and command structures can allow leaders
to persuade participants to refrain from violence, even in emotionally charged situations.36
Moreover, a centralized leadership provides recognizable leaders that can negotiate with
governments on behalf of the movement, which further advantages moderates to leverage
resources and political organization.37 Our argument is not that centralized leaderships and
hierarchical structures alone motivate the government to oﬀer concessions. In contrast, we
claim that, combined with a credible risk of conﬂict escalation, a centralized leadership and
hierarchical structure can confer an important advantage to moderates as governments are
more likely to believe they stem violent fringe groups and radicalization. Without followers,
violent fringe groups cannot grow and become vulnerable to counterterrorism eﬀorts.38 In
sum, nonviolent dissident campaigns that are hierarchically structured and have a centralized
leadership should be more likely to be oﬀered political concessions when fringe terrorism and
a demonstrated potential for escalating violence occur.
Our theory has two important scope conditions. First, since many strong movements
can prevent the emergence of potential violent organizations perpetrating terrorist attacks
in the ﬁrst place, we will not observe systematic terrorism. Although such groups may get
concessions more often, this is driven by the direct weight of the movement itself rather
than the threat of escalation. Still, even capable moderate organizations often see the
emergence of fringe terrorism outside their control.39
Second, if terrorism could provide a potential advantage in terms of a credible threat,
one might wonder if nonviolent campaigns could have incentives to encourage fringe
terrorism. Note that fringe terrorist groups also threaten the moderate leadership, and that
violence in general undermines the broad participation that maximizes a nonviolent
campaign’s prospects for success.40 Thus, eﬀorts to encourage violent factions normally
generate more disadvantages for a nonviolent campaign than possible beneﬁts, especially if
violent fringes threaten to take over the leading role in the movement. Appearing to either
tolerate or failing to condemn violent activities often undermines the legitimacy of
moderate groups. It can be diﬃcult to establish the precise relationships between violent
fringes and civil resistance campaigns’ leaders, especially as the latter have incentives to
deny ties with violent fringe groups. However, in our data (described in more detail
below) we do not ﬁnd any cases where mainstream nonviolent organizations either
directly organized or colluded with fringe terrorist groups.
Illustrative cases
Before turning to a large-N comparative analysis, we consider a series of illustrative
cases to emphasize the causal mechanisms. We start by examining two “most likely”
cases, where the mechanism would have to be discernable, if the theory could work at
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 5
all.41 We ﬁrst consider the 2005–6 mass civil resistance campaign against Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which involved both fringe terrorism and hierarchically
organized campaigns. In line with our argument, the government made major accom-
modations to the moderate organizations that remained committed to nonviolence and
these concessions were explicitly framed as attempts to limit the escalation and
radicalization that might otherwise result. Since the Thai case could be seen as a case
where the support of established institutions plays a central role in ensuring that the
movement reaches its goals, we consider a second case with more deep-seated upheaval
against the existing order, namely the 1990–91 mass civil resistance campaign against
the Communist regime in Albania. Here, even though the government formally
retained control of the army and coercive apparatus, we also ﬁnd concessions to
moderate organizations, and clear references to how the alternative could be worse
and entail dramatic escalation. To show that terrorism alone does not produce con-
cessions in the absence of a strong moderate faction, we then consider the case of the
1972–2009 dissident campaign for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka. The initial weak-
ness of the moderate factions in the movement allowed the violent fringe movement
known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to eﬀectively displace the
nonviolent umbrella campaign Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).42 This started
the transformation from a largely non-violent campaign to a civil war that was to last
decades, ultimately resulting in a decisive win for the Sri Lankan government.
2005–6 Thai crisis
The 2005–6 anti-government campaign in Thailand demonstrated how Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had become unpopular, due to increasingly autocratic
rule, with severe human rights and civil liberties violations, and unpopular privatiza-
tion measures. In 2005, the government removed from TV a talk show by publishing
mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, which often denounced government corruption and abuse
of power. Sondhi Limthongkul then mobilized a large nonviolent dissident campaign
calling for Thaksin Shinawatra to resign. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
established in February 2006 successfully brought together a broad coalition, including
unions opposed to the privatization of state enterprises, human rights activists, fac-
tions in the Thai military who objected to nepotism, as well as groups objecting to
corruption.43 In November 2005, Thaksin Shinawatra sued Sondhi Limthongkul, who
was drawing thousands of individuals to weekly rallies.44 Observers believed that
violence could arise during the protests in Bangkok,45 and January 2006 saw terrorist
attacks directed at Thaksin Shinawatra and the Ministry of Justice, and threats of
violence by radical university student factions.46 There is no evidence that PAD
orchestrated these violent attacks, and Sondhi Limthongkul repeatedly called for
peaceful rallies and to avoid violence.47 Thaksin Shinawatra stepped down on
February 24, 2006 and called new elections. In a resignation speech, Thaksin
Shinawatra noted that national intelligence reported that “ill-intentioned people”
were trying to inﬁltrate the dissident campaign in order to instigate violence and
stressed how this had made him decide to dissolve the government and seek to resolve
the crisis through elections.48
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The 1990–91 Albania crisis
The events leading to the end of Communist rule in Albania 1990–91 also illustrate the
possible moderate advantage in crises with fringe terrorist violence. When long-
standing dictator Enver Hoxha died in 1985, his successor Ramiz Alia took over
a country with massive economic challenges.49 Mass demonstrations emerged through-
out the country during the second half of 1990, fuelled by economic scarcity and
decreasing fear of repression after the fall of the Berlin wall and end of many Socialist
regimes earlier in the year.50 November 1990 saw a series of violent attacks, including
lynched police oﬃcers and attacks on public buildings.51 Alia highlighted the risk of
escalating violence, and how “the country threatens to be destabilized and cast into
anarchy.”52 In December 1990, moderates formed an umbrella organization called the
Democratic Party of Albania, and this organized base for the opposition was met “with
the tacit consent of the Communist leadership.”53 The Democratic Party of Albania
demonstrated its willingness and ability to maintain non-violent discipline and avoid
further escalation of violence. Its leader Arben Imame denounced violence by “hooli-
gans and provocateurs” and stressed how “the Democratic Party was for continuing
peaceful dialogue with Communist leaders.”54 Alia subsequently met with the
Democratic Party leaders. He initiated a process of concessions, “sacking ﬁve politburo
members, [and] promising to hold multi-party elections next February and vowing to
make changes in the government.”55 Over the following months, the communist party
joined the opposition parties in a coalition government to secure political stability and
isolate violent fringes.56
The 1972–2009 Tamil secessionist campaign
The fate of the initially non-violent Tamil independence movement in Sri Lanka
illustrates how fringe terrorism can generate problems for civil resistance movements
when moderate factions and the central leadership are weak. It was evident from the
outset that the moderate leadership in the Tamil movement was ineﬀective in mobiliz-
ing and coordinating a coherent nonviolent mass movement.57 After several failed
attempts to secure Tamil autonomy within a larger federal state over the previous
decade, the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government de facto excluded the main-
stream Tamil political parties from access to political inﬂuence in the early 1970s. As
a reaction to the increasing discrimination and repression, various Tamil parties and
groups funded the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972. However, the TUF failed to gain
a clear position as leading representative of the Tamil population.58 A leading indivi-
dual in what would later emerge as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
argues that TUF leaders failed “to oﬀer leadership and guidance to carry out an
eﬀective programme of action.”59 Although more militant groups advocating terrorist
violence such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were not formally part of
the mass movement, the TUF failed to isolate the fringe group and maintain support
for a non-violent strategy.60 By the late 1970s the militant groups eventually became
much more than violent fringes, and the LTTE assumed the role as the leading Tamil
organization with increasingly mass support.61
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Comparative analysis
In this section we move beyond individual case studies to illustrate the divergent eﬀects of
terrorism in non-violent campaigns depending on the strength of the moderate central
leadership and consider explicit comparisons to success rates across diﬀerent campaign
proﬁles. We provide a comparative empirical analysis of whether hierarchically organized
nonviolent campaigns have been able to gain concessions at a higher rate in situations
with fringe violence across a large number of cases. We identify nonviolent campaigns
based on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset.
This records 109 primarily nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1946 and 2006, and it
classiﬁes whether campaigns see varying degrees of “success.”62 For the primarily non-
violent NAVCO campaigns, we then identify terrorist attacks by groups with related
political goals as the resistance campaign, using a procedure explained in more detail
below. Finally, we use information from NAVCO to identify whether the civil resistance
campaign has a hierarchical structure and centralized leadership.
The NAVCO data classify mass dissident campaigns as nonviolent if this is the primary
resistance method and participation is limited to unarmed civilians.63 Note that this does
not exclude the use of low-level violent tactics by other dissident organizations, as long as
these do not become dominant or primary tactics.64 Civil resistance campaigns are deﬁned
as a “series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of
a political objective, … taking place outside the institutional realm of politics, and
confrontational in nature.”65 They must entail shared maximalist goals, have at least
1,000 observed participants, and there must be evidence of coordination among
participants.66
Our main outcome variable is whether civil resistance campaigns see substantial gains.
This is based on the ordinal progress variable in NAVCO, which measures the achieve-
ments of a campaign on an annual basis and speciﬁc type of political concessions from the
targeted government. If a state does not change its position at all, the “status quo” prevails
(with a value of 0). If the state does not make formal concessions, but changes its behavior
to accommodate the opposition, for example allowing greater political openness, we have
“visible gains short of concessions” (with a value of 1). Verbal statements of conciliation or
changes in the stated position of the regime without additional action constitute “limited
concessions” (2). Real actions short of ultimate capitulation, such as policy changes, the
removal of state leaders, or the initiation of negotiations with the opposition, constitute
“signiﬁcant concessions” (3). When the campaign entirely achieves its stated political
objectives, we have “complete success” (4). Erica Chenoweth and Orion Lewis note that
coders often had highly subjective judgments as to whether a campaign achieved a value of
3 or 4. As a consequence, they recommend relying on a “dichotomous variable indicating
‘strategic success’ (3 & 4) or ‘otherwise’ (0, 1, & 2).”67 Based on this suggestion, we
operationalize substantial gains as a dichotomous variable, identifying whether civil
resistance campaigns reach signiﬁcant gains or complete success or not. We also consider
an alternative measure restricted to only campaigns that see complete success, ignoring all
lower level concessions. This provides a stricter measure of success since full accommoda-
tion can only be coded in the ﬁnal years and not during ongoing campaign years.
We identify terrorism occurrence by ﬂagging systematic fringe terrorism by factions
sharing political goals related to the objectives of the nonviolent campaigns. We consider
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terrorist violence as systematic if there are at least three terrorist attacks by organizations
sharing the same political goals as the civil resistance movement in a given year. We
believe that a dichotomous indicator is more appropriate than the count events, since we
are not interested in the intensity of terrorism, and the severity of attacks in any event is
not unambiguously measured by the number of attacks. Our main tests use a threshold at
three or more terrorist attacks, since single individual attacks are often ﬂukes that may not
reﬂect organized groups or systematic terrorism.
We extract terrorism attacks during civil resistance campaigns from the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) for nonviolent movements between 1970 and 2006 and we
code independently terrorist attacks in campaigns before 1970 (see Online Appendix
Table 1). We use the GTD’s three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to
identify terrorist events: 1) Attacks must be intentional; 2) Attacks entail the use or the
threat of violence; 3) Perpetrators are non-state actors; 4) Attacks must be aimed at
political, economic, or social goals (the exclusive pursuit of economic proﬁt does not
satisfy this criterion); 5) Attacks must have intention to coerce, intimidate, or transmit the
same message to a larger audience than the immediate victims; 6) Attacks must be outside
the context of legitimate warfare activities, and violate humanitarian law with regard to
targeting civilians or non-combatants.68
We only consider terrorist attacks carried out by groups and actors sharing the broad
political claims of the civil resistance campaigns (e.g., regime change, independence). To
verify that the goals are similar, we used information on the perpetrators and audience of
terrorist activities using the GTD search tool (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/) as
well as news reports from Lexis Nexis. We follow the protocol suggested by Walter
Enders, Todd Sandler, and Krushav Gaibulloev to extract domestic terrorist attacks
from the GTD,69 which requires that terrorist strategies must have direct consequences
for the country only, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. Some civil resistance
campaigns included in the NAVCO data involve terrorist groups that target foreign states,
considered to be occupying forces. Although these normally fall under what Enders and
co-authors deﬁne as transnational terrorism,70 we include all actions by violent groups
pursuing goals that are similar to a civil resistance campaign, focusing on the location
where attacks take place. For example, a terrorist attack by Palestinian nationals targeting
Israeli or Palestinian nationals in Israel would be counted as a domestic attack, but we do
not include a terrorist attack perpetrated by Palestinians against US nationals outside
Israel, even if aimed at furthering the liberation of Palestine. We traced the timeline of
terrorist activities and concessions in campaigns using secondary sources to ensure that
attacks occurred prior to any political progress or concessions within the year. We do not
include any cases of terrorism after full accommodation to nonviolent campaigns, which
could reﬂect terrorism used to spoil or undermine existing settlements.
Our measure of hierarchical structure (hierarchy) is a dichotomous variable from
NAVCO 2.0, identifying whether nonviolent civil resistance campaigns have “a clear
centralized leadership structure, hierarchically organized and with clear lines of author-
ity—often but not necessarily focused on a single leader.”71 This excludes cases where
diﬀerent organizations participate in the same civil resistance campaign with their own
individual leaders, each of which has inﬂuence over the contentious political tactics and
strategies of their individual organizations, or if there is no identiﬁable leadership in
a campaign.72
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Our ﬁnal dataset in the analysis includes 307 annual observations. We ﬁrst examine the
distribution of cases with and without major concessions across presence/absence of
systematic terrorism and hierarchical campaign organization. Our argument is not that
we should expect to see more concessions from either feature alone, but it is important to
consider ﬁrst whether there is a clear unconditional relationship with either factor before
we can consider the conditional relationship. In Table 1 we compare the share of civil
resistance campaigns with systematic terrorism occurrence against whether the campaign
sees signiﬁcant political gains. As can be seen, we observe systematic use of terrorist
attacks in 30.6% of the campaign years included in the table. We have a marginally higher
share of campaign years with substantial gains in instances where we see systematic
terrorism than in campaigns without. However, the majority of campaigns both with
and without terrorism do not see concessions.
Table 2 displays the share of campaigns with substantial progress by hierarchical
structure. As can be seen, 31.33% of the campaign years included in the table have
a hierarchical structure. We see a slightly higher share with substantial progress in
campaigns with a hierarchical structure than in campaigns without, but the diﬀerence is
modest, and the modal outcome remains no substantial gains even for campaigns with
hierarchical structure.
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 do not provide any support for the hypothesis that
either systematic terrorism or hierarchical campaign structures by themselves are clearly
associated with diﬀerences in the prospects for concessions. In the analysis below, we
examine the evidence for the interactive eﬀect implied by our argument, and we also
consider a number of control variables possibly associated with either systematic terrorism
or hierarchical campaign structures.
Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan ﬁnd that nonviolent dissident campaigns are more
likely to succeed in democratic regimes,73 and some studies argue that democracies
provide a favorable environment for terrorist groups.74 We thus control for democracy,
using a dichotomous variable ﬂagging if a country has a score of 6 and above in the “Polity
2” index of Polity IV data.75 Although we expect democracies to be more responsive to
political demands and provide more avenues for dissent, it should be kept in mind that the
NAVCO data are limited to maximalist claims on the state.76 Since such maximalist
campaigns are uncommon in democracies in the ﬁrst place, any cases that we actually
observe in democracies are likely to be atypical cases where states are particularly reluctant
to oﬀer concessions, as in ethnic separatist claims that threaten an existing polity.
Table 1. Substantial gains for campaigns by systematic terrorism.
Systematic Terrorism
Substantial Gains No Yes
No 134 50
(63.51%) (53.76%)
Yes 77 43
(36.49%) (46.24%)
Total 211 93
(100%) (100%)
Table entries are counts; percentages of column totals in parentheses. The total number of
observations in the table is 304 due to unavailable reliable information on terrorism
occurrence for 3 observations.
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Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan also ﬁnd some evidence that longer nonviolent
campaigns are less likely to obtain political gains.77 Campaign duration may be correlated
with terrorism as factions may adopt terrorist tactics when nonviolent campaigns have
gone on for a long time without delivering the desired political outcomes.78 We thus
control for the duration of the dissident campaign, using the log of years elapsed since the
beginning of the mass civil resistance mobilization for each campaign (after adding 1 to
the base).
Larger mobilization increases the likelihood of success for civil resistance campaigns.79
Terrorism is also plausibly associated with campaign size, since factions are more likely to
become disillusioned with the eﬀectiveness of nonviolence and turn to terrorism when
a campaign remains small.80 We thus include a measure from NAVCO indicating the
order of magnitude of campaign sizes measured by the number of participants, ranging
from 0: 1–999; 1: 1,000–9,999; 2: 10,000–99,999; 3: 100,000–499,999; 4 = 500,000–
1 million; to 5 > 1 million.81
Chenoweth and Stephan argue that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to be resilient
in the face of repression than violent campaigns,82 and repression is also believed to
encourage resort to terrorism.83 We thus control for repression against campaigns, using
data from NAVCO 2.0, capturing “the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated by
the state” against mass dissidents in a given year, on a four-point scale, ranging from no
repression, to repression with the intention to kill.84
Chenoweth and Stephan ﬁnd that nonviolent campaigns have been more often success-
ful after the Cold War.85 We have a possible period diﬀerence for terrorism here as well, as
terrorism has become more common by many estimates, especially after the mid-2000s.
We thus add a post-Cold War dummy for the period after 1992.
Low income may be associated with grievances that can motivate both more organized
nonviolent dissent and resort to terrorism.86 We control for a country’s GDP per capita
(logged) using data from Gleditsch’s dataset.87
In order to test more formally that organized fringe terrorism constitutes a perceived
threat of conﬂict escalation for governments in a way that less organized violence does
not, we compare systematic terrorism and riots during campaigns in alternative analyses.
Riots can also be contagious and have a potential mobilizing eﬀect, which some argue
promotes concessions.88 We create a measure of Riots, using a binary measure based on
information from the “Cross-national Time Series Data Archive,” ﬂagging if there is at
least one riot or clash with the police of more than 100 citizens involving physical force.89
It is possible that our ﬁndings reﬂect a more general eﬀect of any type of violent action
Table 2. Substantial gains by hierarchical structure.
Hierarchical Structure
Substantial Gains No Yes
No 129 56
(62.62%) (59.57%)
Yes 77 38
(37.38%) (40.43%)
Total 206 94
(100%) (100%)
Table entries are counts; percentages of column totals in parentheses. The total number of
observations in the table is 300 due to lack of reliable information on the organizational
structure of the campaigns for 7 observations.
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perpetrated by radical ﬂanks, including conventional military strategies and guerrilla
attacks. To examine this, we consider alternative analyses with a measure from
NAVCO, indicating whether a “radical ﬂank” using any type of violence is active at the
same time as the non-violent campaign.90 We present descriptive statistics of all variables
in the Online Appendix. Multicollinearity is a possible concern, but neither the correlation
matrix nor Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) tests show any speciﬁc danger.
Empirical results
In Table 3 (below) we report probit regressions estimates of the eﬀects of the
covariates on substantial gains. We report standard errors clustered by campaigns,
since the variance may diﬀer systematically across cases. We also control for time
dependence, using the log of campaign time without prior substantial gain.91 Before
turning to the main features of interest, we comment on the control variables, based
on the estimates in Model 1. In line with previous research, we ﬁnd that larger civil
resistance campaigns are more likely to see substantial political gains. We also ﬁnd
that repression appears to make substantial political gains less likely, and concessions
are less likely during the Cold War period. Mass civil resistance campaigns in demo-
cratic states also appear to be less likely to see political gains, but the coeﬃcient
estimates are not consistently signiﬁcant. We stress again that maximalist nonviolent
Table 3. Probit estimates, substantial gains in civil resistance campaigns.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Terrorism 0.478** 0.087
(0.223) (0.231)
Terrorism*hierarchy 1.706***
(0.554)
Hierarchy −0.036 −0.450 −0.144 −0.316 −0.054 0.340
(0.230) (0.286) (0.229) (0.361) (0.232) (0.347)
Democracy (lag) −0.406 −0.542** −0.335 −0.341 −0.306 −0.331
(0.250) (0.255) (0.233) (0.237) (0.238) (0.238)
Campaign size 0.360*** 0.405*** 0.364*** 0.380*** 0.353*** 0.347***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.080) (0.082)
Duration (log) 0.900** 0.912** 0.930*** 0.951*** 0.739** 0.831**
(0.347) (0.370) (0.337) (0.337) (0.329) (0.343)
Repression −0.188** −0.195** −0.183** −0.200** −0.189** −0.186**
(0.084) (0.085) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092)
Cold War −0.412** −0.375* −0.478** −0.467** −0.606*** −0.602***
(0.210) (0.208) (0.211) (0.207) (0.215) (0.221)
GDP per capita (log) −0.082 −0.138 −0.088 −0.105 −0.133 −0.132
(0.094) (0.089) (0.098) (0.095) (0.088) (0.089)
Years without progress (log) −1.142*** −1.067*** −1.156*** −1.160*** −1.053*** −1.120***
(0.240) (0.257) (0.238) (0.238) (0.228) (0.244)
Radical ﬂanks (NAVCO) 0.126 0.005
(0.233) (0.254)
Radical ﬂanks * 0.396
Hierarchy (0.470)
Riots 0.087 0.281
(0.201) (0.247)
Riots*hierarchy −0.611
(0.423)
Constant −0.376 0.028 −0.228 −0.082 0.343 0.162
(0.902) (0.876) (0.951) (0.934) (0.885) (0.896)
Observations 236 236 234 234 231 231
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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campaigns are unlikely in the ﬁrst place in democratic systems, precisely because these
provide greater possibilities for dissent to be pursued through regular political chan-
nels. The bulk of the maximalist campaigns take place in non-democracies, which
prevent meaningful opportunities for voicing political demands.92 A longer duration
appears to increase the likelihood that mass dissident campaigns will see political
gains. This is consistent with the idea that more capable moderate organizations that
can sustain nonviolent discipline throughout a campaign are more likely to see
success. Finally, a country’s GDP per capita does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on substantial political gains.
In Model 1 we consider the likelihood of substantial political gains by systematic
terrorism occurrence and campaign hierarchical structure individually, with the control
variables. We ﬁnd some evidence of a modestly positive and weakly signiﬁcant eﬀect of
terrorism occurrence on substantial political gains, and little evidence that hierarchical
campaign structure by itself has any consistent eﬀect on the likelihood of gains. In Model
2 we introduce the interactive term implied by our argument. As can be seen, the small
individual coeﬃcient for terrorism suggests that fringe terrorism in the absence of
a hierarchical campaign does not increase prospects for campaign success. However, the
large estimated positive interactive term for terrorism and hierarchical campaign structure
is consistent with the idea that fringe violence can spur crises resolved to moderate
advantage, if the moderate factions have credible prospects of preventing escalation.
In Figure 1 we plot the predicted probabilities of success for four proﬁles on the key
variables with 90% conﬁdence intervals, keeping other values at the median. We can see
that campaigns with a hierarchical organization have a considerably higher likelihood of
substantial gains in the presence of fringe terrorism, and that neither hierarchical structure
nor terrorism notably increase prospects for concessions.
In Models 3 and 4 we consider whether eﬀects are speciﬁc to terrorism, using the
radical ﬂanks indicator from the NAVCO data. We ﬁnd no evidence that the radical
ﬂank indicator generates similar results, either in having a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence
by itself (Model 3) or signiﬁcant interaction with hierarchical campaign structure
(Model 4). Finally, Models 5 and 6 include fringe violence in the form of riots.
Again, the apparent eﬀects of systematic fringe terrorism for hierarchical campaigns
do not seem to generalize to disorganized violence such as riots without clear coordi-
nation or organization. Hence, the ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that only
organized violence can constitute a credible threat of conﬂict escalation and induce
a state to make concessions.
We have also conducted a number of additional robustness tests reported in the supple-
mentary appendix. Our main ﬁndings do not change when clustering standard errors by
countries rather than campaigns and remain also robust to alternative control variables and
measures (see Appendix). The results are robust to an alternative more restrictive measure
limited to full success; when estimating a multinomial logit models with graded measures of
the success outcomes and when including anti-colonial campaigns (see Appendix).93
Conclusion
Much of the existing research on fringe violence in civil resistance campaigns has looked for
unconditional positive and negative eﬀects of violent activities on political outcomes,
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irrespective of type of violence or the characteristics of the movement. We have identiﬁed
speciﬁc conditions under which a particular type of low-level organized violence, namely
terrorist attacks, can induce crises that are resolved to the advantage of moderate leaders
with strong organizations. We have argued that terrorism can induce a plausible threat of
escalation and encourage governments to concede to moderate organizations when these
have more organized structures and can credibly prevent radicalization and escalation to
more extensive violence. Fringe terrorism generates a credible threat of conﬂict escalation in
a way that disorganized violence during mass civil resistance activities does not, as terrorism
implies organized attempts to escalate the conﬂict that are a plausible precursor to major
organized violence. Our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with this argument, and highlight
the value of focusing on how speciﬁc types of fringe violence and the characteristics of
campaigns can aﬀect the strategic environment and incentives of the state.
Although we have highlighted a set of very speciﬁc conditions that can induce
a credible threat of escalation and resulting advantages for stronger moderate groups,
we have not examined the more general eﬀects of terrorism, and the many predominantly
negative consequences that fringe violence may have on nonviolent civil resistance move-
ments. In particular, it is likely that fringe violence can undermine participation in
nonviolent campaigns and alienate potential supporters, and possibly also undermine at
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of substantial gains for campaign proﬁles, all other variables at the
median, with 90% conﬁdence intervals.
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the outset the emergence of precisely the type of strong organizations that could withstand
the potential challenges from fringe violence at a later stage.
Our research suggests many potentially promising extensions to understand how features,
tactics, and organizational structures can condition the prospects of short-term success and
failure in civil resistance campaigns. For example, it may be possible to identify speciﬁc types
of strategies movements use to retain support and prevent fringe violence. Plausibly, non-
violent movements emerging from membership-based organizations such as trade unions or
traditional structures such as religious institutionsmay be better able tomaintain support than
movements emerging spontaneously from for example student activism, without prior orga-
nizational structures. Studying support dynamics and how this responds to the activities of
movement leaders and the state is diﬃcult with current data, which rarely provide over-time
information on participation. However, some researchers have suggested ways to identify
protest size or participation in speciﬁc cases.94 It may be possible to use experimental methods
to understand the impact of fringe violence and terrorism on individual decisions, or explore
computational models of participation in protest.
Moreover, to understand responses to conﬂict dynamics and their short and long-run
outcomes, it would be helpful to consider more explicit measures of success, identifying
the actual political concessions as well as the distributional consequences for speciﬁc
groups and segments. Tactics and competitions could aﬀect the likelihood of speciﬁc
political outcomes such as powersharing, or changes in political institutions such as
leadership change or a transition process. For example, both the ability and willingness
of nonviolent campaigns to accept powersharing agreements could be aﬀected by whether
groups face competition with violent fringe groups, and a dominant campaign that faces
no challenges may be less likely to accept powersharing proposals and less willing to settle
for smaller concessions, in ways that can ultimately undermine pluralism and diversity.95
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